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TRADING IN HUMAN MISERY: A HUMAN RIGHTS

PERSPECTIVE ON THE TAMPA INCIDENT

Irene Khan

t

Three years ago, while working for the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, I witnessed hundreds of tired children, women,
and men from Kosovo who spent the night in the open, at Blace, in freezing
cold weather. They had been refused entry into Macedonia the night before,
ostensibly because their sheer numbers constituted a threat to national security.
I later learned that among those pushed back was a well-known political
dissident, who was later shot dead by the Serbs on his return.
In December 2001, as Secretary General of Amnesty International, I
visited the Jalozai camp in Pakistan, where I met an Afghan woman named
Zainab. After her husband had been killed by the Taliban in northern
Afghanistan, she had moved to Kabul. She later was forced to move from
Kabul to Pakistan after an American bomb destroyed her home and killed her
seven-year-old son. She described to me how she had held in her hand the head
of her son, severed from his body by the bomb, while pieces of his limbs lay
scattered around her. Only a few hours earlier, I had pleaded with General
Musharraf, the President of Pakistan, to grant Afghans, like Zainab, asylum in
Pakistan. He replied that Pakistan's border was closed because the country
could not bear the endless burden of refugees.
In March 2002, I visited a trauma center for torture victims in Sydney,
Australia. I met an Iraqi man there, who had been recognized as a refugee after
prolonged detention; however, he was given only a Temporary Protection Visa
("TPV") because he had entered Australia without a visa. He asked Amnesty
International to help him file a case against the Australian navy, which, he
claimed, stood by as his wife drowned after her boat sank in Australian
territorial waters. His wife was trying to enter Australia clandestinely because
his TPV status did not allow him to apply for family reunification. He told me
t The author, Irene Khan, has served as Secretary General of Amnesty International since August 2001.
Prior
to joining Amnesty International, Irene Khan worked for theUnited Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees for twenty-one years, working directly with refugees and displaced persons to protect their rights. The
author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Eve Lester, Head, Refugee Unit, Amnesty International, in
writing this Article.
See Mark Baker, Pakistan Leader's Swipe at Australia's Refugee Ban, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Oct. 24, 2001, LEXIS, News Library (quoting General Musharraf, the President of Pakistan, in an apparent
reference toAustralia's refusal toallow Tampa asylum seekers to disembark in Australia, justifying Pakistan's
action, "You can compare this when you think of Australia not accepting even 200 refugees .... So a poor
country, an economically weak country like Pakistan cannot really accept refugees over this great figure of 2.5
million.").
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that he had not been able to attend his wife's funeral in Indonesia because, as a
TPV holder, he could not have re-entered Australia if he had left.
What connection do these diverse cases have with the MN Tampa? It is
true that none of these people came by boats, and it is equally true that two of
the
the cases had nothing directly to do with Australia, and one even pre-dated
crisis.2
Tampa. However, these are but other variations of the Tampa
These cases all demonstrate the widely condoned policy of governments
today to restrict and deny asylum, effectively undermining refugee protection in
the name of immigration control and national self-interest. This policy is based
either on the belief that these people are irregular migrants who do not deserve
protection, or that they are refugees who should find protection elsewhere.
Each government, in turn, pushes the problem to the next country until the
asylum seekers end up in the very danger they were trying to escape.
Under this policy, at its simplest, governments close borders, as was seen
in Pakistan, where Afghan refugees were denied entrance. At its most
sophisticated, governments introduce measures such as visa restrictions and
3
At its most stark,
carrier sanctions, as seen in many Western countries.
governments intercept refugee boats on the high seas before the asylum seekers
reach the "migration zone' 4 of the destination country. The United States
initiated this practice when it intercepted boat migrants from Haiti in the early
1990s; 5 Australia is now following in the footsteps of the United States by
6
repelling boat migrants from Afghanistan and Iraq. The human toll for those
One
daring to circumvent such government barriers to entry is high.
organization, UNITED for Intercultural Action, has documented the cases of
more than 3000 asylum seekers who have died seeking access to the European
Union between 1993 and May 2002. 7 Many other asylum seekers have lost
their lives while trying to flee persecution; however, accurate figures of those
lost can never be known.
The Tampa case does not stand in isolation. It is part of a wider pattern
of restrictive asylum policies. To fully understand the significance of the
Tampa case, one should go back more than two decades to the exodus of the
' For a detailed description of Australia's Tampa Crisis, see Emily C. Peyser, Comment, "Paciflc
Solution"? The Sinking Right to Seek Asylum in Australia, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 431 (2002); Jessica E.
Tauman, Comment, Rescued at Sea, but Nowhere to Go: The Cloudy Legal Waters of the Tampa Crisis, II PAC.
RIM L. & POL'Y J. 461 (2002).
3

See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,

No

FLIGHTS TO SAFETY:

CARRIER

SANCTIONS; AIRLINE

EMPLOYEES AND THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES 1 (1997), http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/ACT340211997
(last visited Dec. 7, 2002).
4 Migration Act 1958, §5 (Austl.).
' For a discussion of the U.S. interdiction program, see Sale v. Haitian -Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155
(1993). See also Peyser, supra note 2, at 444-46.
6 For a retelling of the Tampa crisis and events following, see Peyser, supra note 2, at 455-60.
'

UNITED FOR INTERCULTURAL

ACTION,

EUROPEAN NETwORK AGAINST NATIONALISM,

RACISM,

FASCISM AND IN SUPPORT OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES, LIST OF 3026 DOCUMENTED REFUGEE DEATHS
THROUGH FORTRESS EUROPE 1-10 (2002), http://www.united.non-profit.nl/pdfs/listofdeaths.pdf (last visited
Dec. 7, 2002).
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Vietnamese boat people. 8 Then, as now, boatloads of asylum seekers were
pushed away, and refugees were detained on small islands, including, for
example, Galang Island in Indonesia. 9 Then, as now, many asylum seekers
drowned as their calls of distress went unnoticed or unheeded. In response to
this exodus, asylum, as a permanent solution to refugee problems, was
diminished with the crafting of the notion of temporary refuge'--an initiative
led by Australia with the support of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees ("UNHCR"). 1' The practical problem of what to do with Vietnamese
refugees was solved, not through legal obligations, but through a political
compromise, which provided that refugees would be resettled after a temporary
stay in Australia, primarily to Australia, Canada, and the United States.
Then, as now, refugees were portrayed by states in the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN") as a threat to security and sovereignty.
But then, unlike now, there was a greater political will to find protection and
solutions for refugees. In the case of the Tampa, the Australian Government
has portrayed the asylum seekers as a threat to Australian society and Australian
values, a perspective which received an unexpected boost after the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Australian Defense Minister Peter Reith was
reported as saying that the government had to be allowed to prevent entry by
boat, because "[o]therwise it can be a pipeline for terrorists to come in and use
your country as a staging post for terrorist activities."'1 2 These claims, however,
are without foundation. In fact, the Director-General of Australian Security
Intelligence Organization ("ASIO"), Dennis Richardson, recently reported to
the Australian Parliament that not one asylum seeker of the 6000
screened in the
13
last two and a half years has been rejected on security grounds.
In the post-September 1lth climate of suspicion, mistrust, xenophobia,
and racism, governments and media have had little difficulty effecting a general
fear of foreigners who are seeking asylum. In the public mind those fleeing
terror are confused with those suspected of causing it; consequently, public
support is often cited by democratic governments as a basis for curtailing
refugee protection. In fact, in Australia, Prime
Minister John Howard was re14
elected on the coattails of the asylum issue.

' See W. COURTLAND ROBINSON, TERMS OF REFUGE: THE INDOCHINESE EXODUS AND THE
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 151 (1998); Tauman, supra note 2, at 493-94; Josh Briggs, Comment, Sur Place
Refugee Status in the Context of Vietnamese Asylum Seekers in Hong Kong, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 433,437 (1993).
I
Id.
' Migration Regulations 1994, sched. 2, pt.
785 (Austl.).
UNHCR, Background Note on the Protection of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees Rescued at Sea (Mar.
18, 2002), http://heiwww.unige.ch/conf/psio 230502/files/unher.doc (last visited Jan. 18, 2003).
" Australia Links Asylum Policy to US Attack, BBC NEWS,
Sept. 13, 2001, at
http://new.bbc.co.uk/l/he/world/asia-pacific/1542029.stm.
13 Cynthia Banham, Rotten Safety Measures "Risked Lives at Port Hedland," SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Aug. 23, 2002, LEXIS, News Library.
"4 ElectionAhoy, ECONOMIST (U.S. ed.), Sept. 8, 2001, LEXIS, News Library.
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For most of the world, the image of 438 desperate asylum seekers cast

adrift in the scorching heat on the Tampa, was truly overshadowed by the events
of September l1th. There is little doubt that the post-September 11th
developments will have, and indeed have already had, a significant impact on
the protection of refugees in many parts of the world. Basic rights of asylum
seekers will continue to be trumped by issues of national security, even though
any links to terrorism have yet to be proven. Although overshadowed, the legal
implications of the Tampa case will likely have a more profound and more
serious impact on refugees than the legal implications of September 1 1th.
While post-September 1lth measures target individual asylum seekers who are
perceived as security risks, the Tampa incident represents a broad assault on the
right of any person to seek asylum spontaneously.
The legal implications of Tampa are wide, affecting not only refugee law
and international maritime law, but also international human rights law. For
this reason, Amnesty International submitted an amicus curiaebrief in a petition
filed by Victorian Council for Civil Liberties ("VCCL") and Eric Vadarlis
against the Australian Government. The brief advocated orders that would
oblige the Australian Government to permit the asylum seekers to enter
Australia's migration zone. i5 Upon entry into the migration zone, Tampa
asylum seekers would have been eligible to apply for refugee status under
Australia's migration laws.1 6 The VCCL's action against the Government
succeeded at first,1 7 but failed on appeal.' 8 Although the Government won the
case in the end, it is important to note that the Australian Full Court's opinion
failed to consider Australia's obligations under international law in any
substantive detail. Moreover, the Government avoided any legal scrutiny of its
conduct by hastily passing six bills on September 26, 2001 to impose even
tougher restrictions on the rights of asylum seekers in Australian territory. 19
This Article seeks to place the legal implications arising from the Tampa
case within the context of the broader refugee protection crisis, not only in
Australia, but globally. It warns of the dangers of precipitous ad hoc, unilateral,
and politically motivated policies that endanger the lives of the world's most
marginalized people. It seeks to lift the veil of sovereignty behind which
's

t6

Ruddockv. Vardarlis (2001) 110 F.C.R. 491.
Migration Act 1958 (Austl.).
Vardarlis v. Ruddock (2001) 110 F.C.R. 452, overruled by Ruddock v. Vardarlis (2001) 110 F.C.R.

491.

,8 Ruddock v. Vardarlis (2001) 110 F.C.R. 491.
19 Immediately following the Tampa incident, the Australian Parliament passed retroactive border control

legislation to institute mandatory sentencing for people smugglers, restrict the legal rights of refugees, establish
a new temporary visa system for "illegal" migrants, and excise external territories-including Christmas Island
and Ashmore Reef-from Australia's migration zones. See Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement
Powers) Act, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act, 2001 (Austl.);
Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act, 2001 (Austl.);
Migration Legislation Amendment Act, No. 1, 2001 (Austl.); Migration Legislation Amendment Act, No. 5,
2001 (Austl.); Migration Legislation Amendment Act, No. 6, 2001 (Austl.); and Migration Legislation
Amendment (Judicial Review) Act, 2001 (Austl.).
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Australia has sought to hide, and argues for a protection-sensitive, multilateral
approach to dealing with refugee flows.
I.

THE TAMPA IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW

The position of international maritime law is that persons in distress at
sea must be rescued, which may include delivery to a "place of safety. '2° The
status of the individuals who have been rescued is irrelevant in the
determination of what would be an appropriate "place of safety." It is logical
that "place of safety" should include the right to disembark. In the case of the
Tampa, the logical place of safety would have been the next, nearest, or safest
port of call. It appears that there was some measure of choice on the day of the
rescue, and the Tampa captain chose Christmas Island.
Australia has argued that "[p]eople picked up in distress situations do not
have the right to dictate the country in which they are to be landed. '21 The
Australian Government explained that it was concerned about creating a
precedent for other asylum seekers by allowing boat people to coerce a rescue
vessel into transporting them to their "preferred destination." 22 "Preferred
destination" is language carefully chosen by the Australian Government,
suggesting that there are other options. Australia's Immigration Minister has
also accused asylum seekers of making a "lifestyle choice" when they seek to
enter Australia without a visa. 23
However, if we interpret "preferred
destination" from a human rights perspective as the asylum seekers' desire to
find a "place of protection"-most of which on the Tampa were later found to
have been legitimately seeking-the Australian Government's assertion
assumes a different character. 24
If measures are taken by those rescued to coerce the vessel and redirect it
to another destination, then these are matters to be taken seriously. However,
disembarkation, in the Tampa case, would not have impeded this determination.
2 See Fredrick J. Kenney & Vasilios Tasikas, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 143 (2003) (discussing the
duties to rescue and assist, and analyzing the responses to the Tampa incident by international maritime
organizations); Tauman, supra note 2 (focusing on the legal duties of states under international maritime law
and criticizing Australia's response).
21 Principled Observance of Protection Obligations and Purposeful Action to Fight People
Smuggling
and Organised Crime-Australia's Commitment, document distributed by the Australian Government
delegation at the Global Consultations on International Protection (Sept. 2001) [hereinafter Protection
Obligations].
22 Letter from Philip Ruddock, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, to David Purnell,
National
Administrator,
United
Nations
Ass'n
of
Australia,
Inc.
(Jun.
13, 2000),
http://www.unaa.org.au/wn000613a.html ("Most of these people are not fleeing to the most logical place of
protection-they are seeking out Australia as their preferred destination for migration.").
23 Alison Crosweller & Megan Saunders, Refugees Plight a "Lifestyle Choice," AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 8,
2002, LEXIS, News Library (reporting that Phillip Ruddock, Immigration Minister, claimed that "Most asylumseekers who seek to come to Australia are not fleeing persecution butmaking a 'lifestyle decision."').
24 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AUSTRALIA-PACIFIC, OFFENDING HUMAN DIGNITY-THE "PACIFIC
SOLUTION" 8 (2002), http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidocjpdf.nsf/index/ASA 120092002
ENGLISI{/$FileASA1200902.pdf (last visited Dec. 7, 2001) [hereinafter OFFENDING HUMAN DIGNITY].
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Although Australia argued that the rescuees had no right to dictate the
country in which they were to be landed, it is far from clear whether Australia
itself had the right to dictate the country in which the asylum seekers were to be
landed. As a matter of international maritime law, the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea ("SOLAS") 25 creates a general obligation for
masters to proceed to the assistance of those in distress. Thus, international
maritime law and convention established over many years would tend to
suggest that it is the prerogative of the ship's captain, not that of a nearby State,
to determine the country in which persons in distress are to be landed. Further,
in terms of Australia's obligations, the International Convention on Maritime
Search and Rescue ("SAR Convention") of 1979,26 which entered into force on
June 22, 1985, provides that a party should take measures to expedite entry of
rescue units from other parties into its territorial waters.27
II.

THE TAMPA IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW

The right to seek asylum is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights ("UDHR"),28 and implicitly recognized in the 1951 United
Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees ("Refugee
Convention"), 29 to which Australia is a State Party. 30 Access and entry are
clearly essential in giving effect to the right to seek and enjoy asylum.
Australia's interpretation of the right to seek and enjoy asylum takes a
highly restrictive view of where that right might be exercised and by whom.
The implication is that the people on the Tampa had no right to seek and enjoy
asylum in Australia, despite the fact that they had clearly engaged Australia's
25 United Nations Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 164 U.N.T.S. 113
[hereinafter SOLAS].
26 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, Apr. 27, 1979, amended by Resolution of

the IMO's Maritime Safety Comm., May 18, 1998, Res. MSC 70(69) (effective Jan. 1, 2000) [hereinafter SAR
Convention].
27 SAR Convention, supra note 26, art. 2.1.1.
28 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 71,
U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
29 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, available at http://untreaty.un.org (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954)
[hereinafter Refugee Convention]; United Nations Protocol to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,
opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6224(E), 6230(F), 606 U.N.T.S. 267, available at
http://untreaty.un.org [hereinafter Protocol]. As of January 1,2002, there were 141 States Parties to either the
Refugee Convention or Protocol or both. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, States Parties to
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Jan. 1, 2002), available at http://www.unhcr.ch
[hereinafter States Parties]. Australia is a party to both the Refugee Convention and the Protocol. Id.
30 While the right to seek asylum is not explicitly included in the 1951 [Refugee] Convention, it is
nevertheless implicit in its very existence. Provisions of the [Refugee] Convention which are particularly
relevant to the right to seek asylum include the prohibition on the imposition of penalties for illegal entry
(Article 31), the prohibition on expulsion (Article 32), and, of course, the prohibition on nonrefoulement, or
non-return to a country in which the asylum seeker's life or freedom would be threatened (Article 33).
UNHCR, RELOCATING INTERNALLY AS A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE TO SEEKING ASYLUM: THE SO-CALLED
"INTERNAL
FLIGHT
ALTERNATIVE"
OR
"RELOCATION
PRINCIPLE"
(1999),

http://www.unhcr.ch/research/1egal.htm (UNHCR position paper, last visited Dec. 23, 2002).
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protection obligations by arriving in Australia's territorial waters. 31 Australia
justifies its position on the ground that these asylum seekers were not escaping
directly from their country of origin because they had already landed in another
country of asylum, Indonesia.
While various attempts have been made in refugee law to determine when
an individual already residing outside her country of origin could move
elsewhere to seek protection, it is clear that such a determination should not be
made arbitrarily but should take into account the actual circumstances of the
individual, particularly the availability and effectiveness of protection offered in
the first safe country that she entered.32 Moreover, "[i]t is the humanitarian
obligation of all coastal states to allow vessels in distress to seek haven in their
waters and to grant asylum,
or at least temporary refuge, to persons on board
33
wishing to seek asylum."
By turning away those on board the Tampa, Australia made no effort to
determine the individual circumstances of the asylum seekers or the validity of
their asylum claims-most of which were later found to be genuine. 34 Instead,
Australia used its financial and political clout to persuade the Government of
Nauru to land and detain the refugees. None of the asylum seekers on board
had any connection to Nauru, and none had ever. passed through its territory
prior to being disembarked there. Nauru is not a party to the Refugee
Convention or its 1967 Protocol and has no procedures for processing asylum
seekers. All Nauru offered was detention-with no clarity about how long the
detention might last or where people would go at the end of their stay. By
diverting boatloads of people to the detention center in Nauru (and later Papua
New Guinea)-in exchange for huge sums of money-Australia seems to have
perpetuated the very trafficking of human misery that it claims it is seeking to
prevent.35
III.

THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE TAMPA INCIDENT IN INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

There are also serious concerns about Australia's compliance with
international human rights law and other international standards during the
Tampa crisis. 36 The asylum seekers were denied access to legal counsel,
' Protection Obligations, supra note 21.
32 See Conclusion on the International Protection of Refugees, No. 15 (XXX): Refugees Without an

Asylum Country, UNHCR Executive Comm., U.N. GAOR 30th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/572 (1979),
reprinted in GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 475 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter

Conclusion No. 15]; Conclusions on the Problem of Refugees and Asylum Seekers Who Move in an Irregular
Manner From a Country in Which They Had Already Found Protection, No. 58 (XL), UNHCR Executive
Comm., U.N. GAOR 44th Sess., Supp. No. 12A, at11,U.N. Doe. A/44/12/Add.l (1990).
" Conclusion No. 15, supra note 32.
31 See OFFENDING HUMAN DIGNITY, supranote 24, at 8.

35 Peyser, supra note 2, at 432, n.6.
36

See OFFENDING HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 24, at 12-14.
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detained unlawfully on both the Tampa and HMAS Manoora, and denied the
right to seek asylum in Australia. It is important to place the Tampa case in the
wider context of Australia's policies and practices in refugee law. Arbitrary and
unlawful detention, discrimination, and other deterrent measures are all part of
the same approach, the very approach which underpins the Tampa case, and has
the same consequence of restricting access to asylum.
A.

Discrimination

The Australian Government openly admits that it intentionally
discriminates between people who are "fleeing directly" and refugees making
what it calls "unnecessary secondary movements." 37 The Government
discriminates between asylum seekers by granting either permanent or
temporary protection based on the circumstances of their arrival. It also
discriminates by denying access to asylum seekers who arrive by boat from
other safe countries en route to Australian territory, sending them instead to
Pacific island nations where they are incarcerated. Australia's Prime Minister
has cited Article 31 of the Refugee Convention as justification for this
practice. 3 8 Australia discriminates by detaining those who manage to gain
illegal access to Australian territory, often in remote detention centers-which
have been the recent subject of serious national and international criticism. 39 It
discriminates by only granting TPV status, instead of full refugee status to those
it eventually finds to have legitimate refugee claims. 40 TPV status deprives

31 See Protection Obligations, supra note 21.

" Article 31 of the Refugee Convention prohibits "penalties imposed on refugees." This Article can be
interpreted as an obligation on States Parties to refrain from adopting practices designed to deter certain classes
of asylum seekers from seeking refuge or discriminating against asylum seekers by differentiating between legal
and illegal migrants. See Peyser, supra note 2, at 440. Philip Ruddock stated, however, that "[u]nderlying
Australia's approach is the need to differentiate between those persons directly fleeing from countries in which
they have persecution, and those who come to Australia via countries where they were safe. The Refugees
Convention itself contemplates that difference in the reference to direct flight in Article 31." Philip Ruddock,
Hard Choices-The Asylum Seekers Challenge, Speech at the meeting of the Commonwealth Lawyers'
Association
in
London
(Apr.
22,
2002),
transcript
available
at
http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/speeches/20020422Iondon.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2003).
39 See, e.g., Human Rights and Immigration Detention in Australia, Report of Justice P.N. Bhagwati,
Regional Advisor for Asia and the Pacific of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Mission to Australia, May 24-June 2, 2002; Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee:
Australia, U.N. Doc. A/55/40, paras. 498-528 (2000); Human Rights Committee, Communication No.
560/1993, A v. Australia, views adopted on 3 April 1997, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc.
A/52/40, vol. II; CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, reprinted in 9 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 506 (1997) [hereinafter
Communication No. 560/1993]; Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child:
Australia, U.N. Doe.

CRC/C/15/Add.79 (1979); AUSTRALAN HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION, THOSE WHO'VE COME ACROSS THE SEAS: DETENTION OF UNAUTHORISED ARRIVAL (1998).
" Article 34 of the Refugee Convention, supra note 29, provides that "[t]he Contracting States shall as
far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every
effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such
proceedings." This provision, together with other obligations under the Refugee Convention, comprise what
may be understood as "full refugee status," that is, permanent resettlement in the host country.
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refugees of basic Refugee Convention rights: certainty of status, the right to
leave and return to Australia,4' family reunion,42 and certain social benefits.43
Non-discrimination provisions are found in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") 44 and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"). 45 Both anti-discrimination
provisions proscribe discrimination on the grounds of "race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status.

46

Australia has admitted that such discrimination is

precisely what it is practicing; therefore, Australia is knowingly violating both
conventions.
Australia has suggested that its discriminatory approach is supported by
Article 31 of the Refugee Convention.47 That provision expressly prohibits the
imposition of penalties on persons arriving in a country illegally, who, coming
directly from a country where their life or freedom was threatened, enter or are
present in a new country without authorization, provided they present
themselves without delay and show good cause for their illegal entry or
presence.48 Many of those who seek to enter Australia have been recognized as

having failed to obtain effective asylum elsewhere, and therefore could be said
to have good cause to have arrived illegally. Their flight from their country
may also be said to be direct in the sense that it has not been meaningfully
interrupted by effective protection in another country of asylum.

4' Article 28(1) of the Refugee Convention, supra note 29, provides:

[tlhe Contracting States shall issue to refugees lawfully staying in their territory travel
documents for the purpose of travel outside their territory, unless compelling reasons of
national security or public order otherwise require, and the provisions of the Schedule to this
Convention shall apply with respect to such documents. The Contracting States may issue
such a travel document to any other refugee in their territory; they shall in particular give
sympathetic consideration to the issue of such a travel document to refugees in their territory
who are unable to obtain atravel document from the country of their lawful residence.
42 "Refusal to allow family reunification may be considered as an interference with the right to family life
or to family unity, especially where the family has no realistic possibilities for enjoying that right elsewhere."
Summary Conclusions on Family Unity, UNHCR Global Consultations on International Protection, Geneva
Expert Roundtable, para. 5 (Nov. 8-9, 2001).
4' Refugee Convention, supra note 29, arts. 20-24 (providing for rationing, housing, public education,
public relief, labor legislation, and social security).
41 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (xxi), 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16,
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
ICCPR].
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3,
1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
4 ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 2; ICESCR, supra note 45, art. 2(1).
4 Ruddock, supra note 38 and accompanying text.
4 Refugee Convention, supra note 29, art. 31(1).
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Arbitrary and Unlawful Detention
The Australian Government has made it plain that it is seeking to deter

people smugglers. Its implementation of this deterrence policy includes the
imposition of penalties without charge or trial, including detention, on asylum
seekers attempting to enter Australia to seek asylum. To deprive a person of
their liberty, without charge or trial, as a penalty or simply in 49the name of
deterrence, is in direct violation of international human rights law.
Amnesty International has long held the view that the Australian policy
and practice of mandatory detention is contrary to international human rights
standards. Freedom from arbitrary detention is enshrined in the UDHR ° and
codified in the ICCPR. 51
Furthermore, the Convention on the Rights of the Child 52 prohibits the
detention of children, except as a last resort and, in such an event, for the
shortest possible period of time. 53 Australia routinely detains children for
prolonged periods while their families are processed. International guidelines
on detention of asylum seekers adopted by the UNHCR's Executive Committee
(of which Australia is a member) call for detention to be used only in
exceptional circumstances, to be justified in each individual case, and to be
subject to the safeguard of an independent review.5 4 Neither Australia's
detention policy nor the detention regime exported to Nauru respect these
criteria.
Deprivation of liberty is not just an assault on human rights. It is widely
recognized that prolonged detention, particularly when people are already
traumatized by past persecution and do not know what the future holds for
them, can lead to serious irreparable psychological damage. 55 The Australian
Human Rights Commissioner, the Australian Commonwealth Ombudsman, the
Australian Parliamentary
Committees
and other non-governmental
organizations have repeatedly pointed to the sense of deep frustration and
despair among asylum seekers in detention centers-the kind of hopelessness
and helplessness that has driven people to sew their lips together.56
41 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 14.
50 UDHR, supra note 28, art. 9.

5' ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 9.
'2 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp.
No. 49, U.N. Doe. A/44/49 (1989), 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989).
5
Id. art. 37(b).
54 UNHCR, UNHCR Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and StandardsRelating to the Detention
ofAsylum Seekers (Feb. 1999), at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/+cwwBmeN
Ema wwwwnwwwwwwwhFqA72ZRgRfZNtFqrpGdBnqBAFqA72ZRogRfZNeFqTmnBnDBodDawDmaoD
BnGDwBodDwcatlomncoDn5DzmxwwwwwwwlFqmRbZ/opendo.pdf.
" For a discussion on the detention, see Adrienne McEntee, Comment, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 261
(2003).
56 See, e.g., Press Release, Professor Alice Tay, President, and Dr. Sev Ozdowski, Human Rights
Commissioner, Woomera Immigration Detention Centre-Report of Visit by HREOC Officers (Feb. 6, 2002),
at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a-ccpr.htm.
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Five years ago, on April 30, 1997, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee made a finding that this very same legislation put Australia in
violation of its obligations under the ICCPR.57 The finding clearly established
that Australia's mandatory detention policy does not comply with international
human rights standards. Notwithstanding this, the Human Rights Committee's
finding has been ignored by the Australian Government. In 2000, Australia's
human rights practices (both in relation to refugees and asylum seekers as well
as indigenous Australians) were roundly criticized by a number of treaty bodies,
including the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 58 the
Human Rights Committee, 59 the Committee on the Rights of the Child,60 and the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 6' Australia's response
was a joint Ministerial announcement in August 2000 that Australia 62would be
more selective in the future as to how it would report to treaty bodies.
These responses reflect a growing disrespect in Australian politics for
international standards, and disregard for the role which Australia itself played
in their establishment. The Tampa crisis is consistent with this disrespect. The
treatment of the Tampa asylum seekers was a knee-jerk response, which was
politically motivated, for the benefit of public opinion.
Is it fair or necessary for Australia to adopt a tough detention policy
restricting the rights and privileges of refugees? There is nothing fair about
locking up hundreds of children, women, and men-without charge or review
by a court-simply because they lack a visa, especially considering that the vast
majority of the people who are detained are later found to be valid refugees
according to Australian authorities. There is nothing fair about labeling asylum
seekers as "queue jumpers" when there is no queue they could have joined in
the first place. There is nothing fair about playing on public fears to build a
negative image of refugees. There is nothing fair about trading in human
misery, by paying to transfer people to detention centers on Nauru or Manus
Island.
So what purpose does mandatory detention serve? It was meant as a
deterrent. However, it has failed to be an effective deterrent, with the numbers
of those arriving in Australia without visas rising in 2000 and 2001. Precisely
because the Government found that mandatory detention did not stop the
asylum seekers, it decided to intercept and divert the boatloads elsewhere.
Communication No. 560/1993, supra note 39.
58 Concluding Observations by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Australia,
CERD/C/304/Add. 101 (2000).
" Communication No. 560/1993, supra note 39.
60 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Australia, CRC/C/15/Add.79
9 972
(
; Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Australia,
E/C. 12/l/Add.50 (2000).
62 See Joint Press Release FA97, Alexander Downer, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Daryl
Williams, Attorney-General, and Philip Ruddock, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs,
Improving the Effectiveness of United Nations Committees (Aug. 29, 2000).
"
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Interception and detention are a set of measures now being used to deny access
to Australian territory.
The combination, however, is not sustainable because the "Pacific
Solution"-the transfer and detention at Nauru and Manus Island of asylum
seekers who were on their way to Australia-does not provide a long-term
solution. Indeed, it provides no solution for the refugees and asylum seekers. It
is not clear what will happen to the valid refugees or those who are found not to
be refugees but cannot be sent home. By early August 2002, the Australian
Government was claiming that a "number of countries have indicated a
willingness to consider cases for resettlement." 63 Efforts to find resettlement
places for refugees from camps in Manus Island or Nauru, however, have so far
made little progress. In addition, there is still no proposal on what to do about
those hundreds of people determined not to be refugees, including those who
protection on the basis of broader international
may be entitled to international
64
human rights principles.
IV.

THE WAY FORWARD?

The dramatic and drastic actions of the Australian Government have been
driven by the concern that human smuggling of asylum seekers is undermining,
and might even overwhelm, immigration control. The challenges of preventing
trafficking in migrants and smuggling of persons are unquestionably enormous.
These challenges are only exacerbated by the fact that States increasingly
choose to invoke their sovereign prerogative to control borders. A long-term
solution, however, lies in recognizing the failures of refugee processes and
resettlement and rectifying these. Anne Gallagher describes smuggled and
trafficked persons as "survival migrants. ' 65 Moreover, there is a growing body
of evidence that severely restrictive immigration policies are more likely to fuel,
rather than curb, organized, irregular migration. Importantly, traffickers and
smugglers service a market in which there are both buyers and sellers. People
smuggling is the inescapable consequence of the lack of effective protection and
solutions in the countries where refugees first arrive, and their struggle to
survive, year upon year, in bleak, miserable conditions in camps or squalid
63 Press Release DPS 55/2002, Refugees Arrive in Australia from Nauru, Australian Immigration (Aug.

2002).

64

For example, Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment provides for an absolute prohibition on return of a person to torture. Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res.
39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027
(1984), and in 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985). See also ICCPR, supra note 44; and U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General
Comment 20, U.N. HCHR, 44th Sess., (1992), replacing General Comment 7, Torture or Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1982). See also OFFENDING HUMAN DIGNrrY, supra note 24, at 11.
65 Anne Gallagher, Trafficking, Smuggling and Human Rights: Tricks and Treaties, 12 FORCED
MIGRATION REv. 26, 28 (2002).
66 id.
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urban areas of countries like Pakistan, Iran, Jordan and Kenya. There are not
enough resettlement opportunities to go around, and returning home is too
dangerous. Failure to remove the demand for trafficking and smuggling
services, while engaging in (sometimes armed) interception of those who use
these services, is at best misguided, and at worst actively hypocritical.
Even in the negotiations around the Palermo Protocols on smuggling and
trafficking, 67 the fact that governments were reluctant to build in safeguards for
the protection of refugees and asylum seekers, as well as rights of victims of
smuggling and trafficking, is indicative of the position of States on the problem.
Savings clauses were built in but the extent to which they will be effective
remains to be seen. Australia has not ratified any of these instruments.
Meanwhile, "keep them out at all costs" appears to be the policy of many
governments like Australia. However, Rudd Lubbers, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, says that the answer cannot simply be "keep them
out." 68 "You need69to organize it in a way that we go for the law and not for the
law of the jungle."

Australia has the sovereign right to protect its borders, but it also has the
sovereign obligation to respect international law, including the human rights of
citizens and non-citizens. It cannot pick and choose which rights it will apply,
and how and when. The sovereign powers of a state, including the grant of
asylum, must be exercised responsibly in all places where the state exercises
effective control and jurisdiction. In these places, the state must exercise its
control in accordance with international standards and treaties to which it has
voluntarily subscribed. Sovereignty cannot be raised as a defense to acts which
would otherwise be unlawful as a matter of international law. Nor can it be
raised as a shield to protect states from liability for action exercised extraterritorially. Sovereignty carries with it responsibility.7 ° That should be the
most important lesson from the Tampa crisis.
Experience shows that measures to stabilize refugee flows are only
successful if they provide a meaningful alternative to refugees and protect their
rights. By this simple test, it is clearly time to review Australian policies. A
refugee is a refugee because of the protection she needs, not because of the way

" See Protocolto Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
Supplementing the UN. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, U.N. Doc. A/53/383, at 53
(2000), reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 335 (2001); Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air,

Supplementing the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, U.N. Doc. A/551383, at 62
(2000), reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 335 (2001). The two documents are known as the "Palermo Protocols," protocols
to the U.N. Convention on Transnational Organized Crime.
68 U.N. Attacks Australia's Asylum Policy, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Nov. 16, 2001, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l /hi/world/asia-pacific/1659410.stm.
69 Id.
70 See, e.g., Jens Vedsted-Hansen, Non-Admission Policies and
the Right to Protection: Refugees' Choice
Versus States' Exclusion, in REFUGEE RIGHTS AND REALITIES: EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONCEPTS AND

REGIMES 269, 274 (Frances Nicholson & Patrick Twomey eds., 1999).
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in which she has entered a country. Thus, defining refugees as direct or indirect
entrants is meaningless.
The real answer is for governments not to shirk refugee responsibilities
but to share them. While Australia has been keen to hold a multilateral
conference, involving Indonesia and Pakistan, to curb people smuggling, it has
made no effort at these meetings to encourage and work with these countries to
improve refugee protection by, for example, acceding to the Refugee
Convention. It has approached Pakistan and Jordan to accept Afghan and Iraqi
refugees but has not offered a meaningful increase in resettlement places that
could dampen irregular movements. More efforts need to be made by
governments and the JNHCR to strengthen protection through an approach that
places protection at the center of the search for solutions and involves all
parties. Through such initiatives, change can happen. It requires patience and
dedication, and will not always happen quickly. Meanwhile, however, refugees
should not be held hostages to a problem that governments do not have the
political will to resolve.

